(C) Dr. Chul-soo Lee

Laying the Foundation for Electronic Government in the Turbulent 1970s and 80s, Overcoming Interministerial Egoism and Financial Shortages

South Korea’s administrative computerization serves as the core foundation for its electronic government, which is recognized today as one of the world's finest. However, this massive information technology infrastructure did not enjoy a smooth journey from the very beginning. The process spanning from the initial introduction of computers in the late 1960s to the confirmation of the Master Plan for the Administrative Computer Network in the 1980s was an unprecedented series of technical challenges, intense coordination of conflicting interests among ministries, and a massive struggle to overcome limitations in personnel and budget. Based on the recollections of Dr. Chul-soo Lee—who was the core working-level manager of the project at the time, dedicated to technical integration and resident management tasks—this article provides an in-depth report on the birth of the Korean administrative computer network project and the urgent moments surrounding the establishment of its master plan.

The Light and Shadow of Early Administrative Computerization: The Trap of Monopoly and Limits of Batch Processing

The government’s efforts toward administrative computerization date back to the '7-Year Electronic Computer Utilization Plan' established alongside the launch of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) in May 1967. In January 1969, MOST formulated the 'Comprehensive Electronic Calculation System Development Plan,' pursuing a consistent computer introduction policy encompassing the government, public institutions, and private enterprises. In June of the same year, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) introduced the IBM 1401 to computerize statistical survey operations, formally kicking off the computer era within the government sector. In 1970, the National Electronic Calculation Center was established to overcome the shortage of specialized personnel and limited budget constraints, followed by efforts to expand administrative information systems while curbing indiscreet computer imports and developing software in-house.

The government's computer adoption grew rapidly after 1969, surging from 633 units in 1981 to 1,114 units in 1983—the year the National Backbone Computer Network Project was reported—nearly doubling in just three years. The National Electronic Calculation Center was transferred to the Ministry of Government Administration (MGA) in 1974 and renamed the Government Computer Center (GCC), taking full charge of the efficient operation of government computing resources and supporting the computerization of administrative tasks. However, computerization during this period remained confined to statistical data processing or elementary data management, and the perceived effects were insufficient due to a lack of manpower and budget.

During this transition, the role of the KAIST Computing Center, established in 1967, was unparalleled. Introducing the CDC 3300, a supercomputer at the time, the KAIST Computing Center practically monopolized early administrative computerization tasks based on its outstanding professional workforce, managing telephone bill issuance, budget formulation and allocation, and customs and monopoly administration. It contributed significantly to the advancement of information technology by executing a pilot resident computerization project in Chungcheongbuk-do. However, due to the technical limitations of the era, all processing was restricted to the batch processing method—where data was collected and processed all at once—rather than a real-time online method.

The KAIST Computing Center contributed to the cultivation of the software industry by supplying computing professionals to universities and businesses. Nonetheless, it faced criticism for attempting to monopolize the market as it participated in all computerization projects across both public and private sectors. The self-righteous mindset of the organization hindered collective development and eventually narrowed its own standing, leaving behind a historical lesson as the KAIST Computing Center met a shift in its role. By the late 1970s, individual ministries began independently pushing forward with computerization for tasks requiring large-scale data processing, such as post office telephone bill management, the National Police Agency’s fingerprint management, and the National Tax Service’s tax collection operations. The Army, Navy, and Air Force also introduced computers between the late 1960s and mid-1970s, embarking on the computerization of military management tasks.

(C) Dr. Chul-soo Lee

The 1975 Presidential Directive and the Light and Shadow of the 1st Administrative Computerization Plan

The flow of computerization, which had remained at the level of individual ministries, shifted into a national total mobilization project sparked by President Park Chung-hee’s annual inspection of the Ministry of Government Administration in March 1975. The president's directive at the time was explicit: introduce computer systems to build a foundation for scientific administrative management, achieve efficiency in office work and reductions in budget and manpower in response to changing administrative demands, and alleviate the workload of administrative agencies to maximize the efficiency of public services. In particular, the instruction to minimize the increase of public servants by reducing workloads presented the ultimate direction for administrative computerization.

To execute this, the Ministry of Government Administration launched the 'Administrative Computerization Promotion Committee' in August 1975, chaired by the Prime Minister, and newly established the 'Administrative Computerization Planning Office' in 1977 to take full charge of administrative computer planning. Through several subsequent reorganizations, this body would eventually become the Administrative Computerization Division, managing the overall administrative network project.

Following a fact-finding survey, the Ministry of Government Administration established the '1st Basic Plan for Administrative Computerization (1978–1982)' in February 1978, the first comprehensive plan since the founding of the nation. Its core elements included building a foundation for the Administrative Information System (AIS), prioritizing the development of strategic tasks for each agency, and constructing telecommunication networks. Dr. Chul-soo Lee, who crossed paths with the computerization field by serving as an advisory member for the Ministry of Government Administration while performing research on military structures and weapon systems during his doctoral program at KAIST, recalled the period as follows:

"The 1st 5-Year Plan was merely a collection and compilation of the task requirements submitted by each ministry, remaining at the level of presenting general principles with little difference from existing ministerial plans. However, it was the start of a massive transformation in that it created legal regulations to comprehensively promote administrative task computerization and built a national framework."

Yet, the technical limitations were distinct. A standardized Korean character set was absent, and guidelines for the shared utilization of information resources had not been prepared, making the construction of a substantial single network and connection between systems impossible at the initial stage. Subsequently, the Ministry of Government Administration formulated the 2nd 5-Year Administrative Computerization Plan (1983–1987), but as the new government established a fresh national strategy to nurture the information industry following a regime change, this plan faded away without seeing the light of day.

The Genesis of the National Backbone Computer Network Project and the Formulation of the 'Three Major Tasks'

In the early 1980s, the government completely resurveyed the status of government administrative computerization while conceiving the National Backbone Computer Network Project. Based on 42 task development requests from various ministries in 1984 and a fact-finding survey led by the Ministry of Government Administration in 1985, the government categorized and systematized the administrative computerization project into three major divisions.

Classification System for the Three Major Tasks of the Administrative Computerization Project

This classification and implementation approach was a sophisticated strategy designed to convert both existing and planned tasks into standardized forms through the 2nd and 3rd projects to be executed after the 1st Administrative Computer Network Project, and to integrate them into a single administrative network. This measure, which linked all government information systems to interconnect through a single network, completely transformed the Korean computerization landscape and became the absolute foundation for today’s 'one-stop service' that processes administrative tasks in real time anywhere in the nation. The driving force behind Korea achieving the first place in the UN E-Government Survey lay in designing a single network structure so that information resources could be co-utilized anywhere across the entire country, moving beyond the computerization of isolated tasks.

(C) Dr. Chul-soo Lee

The Cruel History of Requirement Generation: The Divergent Dreams of Developers and Public Servants

From 1985, the administrative network project entered its trajectory in earnest. The government formed a 'Office Improvement Promotion Task Force' for each ministry, headed by a vice-minister, to clarify lines of responsibility. It confirmed the Ministry of Government Administration as the overarching ministry and DACOM (Data Communications Corp. of Korea), established in 1982 to lead data communication network projects, as the dedicated execution agency. Post office computerization was added as a pilot project alongside the existing 6 major tasks, and standardization work commenced.

However, in August 1985, a massive barrier was encountered during the fact-finding survey and collection of detailed requirements conducted across 85 administrative department computer sites. It was necessary to write a 'Requirement Generation Document' covering the workflow, data items, processing cycles, and online processing formats—which constituted the baseline data for building the system—but on-site public servants did not comprehend the concept of computerization itself. Very few public servants understood the entire process of how data entered at a civil service window was reported to higher departments and transformed into statistics.

DACOM, the dedicated agency, also lacked systematic requirement generation methodologies or tools, leading to countless errors in communication between engineers and public servants. Under circumstances where developers had to write the forms on behalf of public servants after listening to verbal explanations because the public servants could not fill them out, the Ministry of Government Administration pressed for the submission of the requirement documents within a mere 30 days. The result was bound to be substandard. Dr. Chul-soo Lee sharply pointed out the scar that this structural failure of the period left on the Korean software industry:

"Requirement generation is the most difficult and time-consuming stage in application software development. The rushed implementation at the time became the root cause of recurring degradation in completeness and cost disputes during information system construction, even 30 years later. During my tenure as the president of the National Computerization Agency, I proposed to the Software Industry Association that we develop a 'Requirement Generation Methodology' and provide free training to public servants to prevent disputes and create stable value for the industry, but it is regrettable that it was not accepted."

These experiences offer significant implications for the electronic government consulting projects that South Korea currently conducts for developing nations. From 2013 to 2017, Dr. Lee consulted on education informatization and IT workforce development systems in Uzbekistan, and witnessed the realities of developing countries by visiting Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand. What they truly desire is not an introduction to the latest current technologies, but the know-how of how a stable system was constructed in a short period amid past poor environments and deficient infrastructure.

In situations where local administrative systems remain at the level of our 1980s and 90s, and even administrative office regulations are non-existent, consulting that only recommends today's information technology is ineffective. For countries where industrialization is incomplete, a convergent approach capable of promoting industrialization and informatization simultaneously must be presented. Rather than obsessing over individual system development, one must first configure the country’s entire Information Technology Architecture (ITA) and approach it from a long-term perspective to ensure gradual, integrated operations to achieve success.

The Confirmation of the Administrative Computer Network Master Plan and the Struggle of DACOM

In September 1985, requirement documents from ministries excluding the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) were received. DACOM formed a joint task force centered around the Administrative Computer Network Project Group (Director Dong-wook Lee) launched in June of the same year, deriving a draft master plan in December, but ministries hesitated to give final confirmation opinions. Finally, in April 1986, the Phase 1 Administrative Computer Network Master Plan was completed and confirmed as a substantive national plan upon being reported to the Computer Network Coordination Committee on July 10 of the same year.

The scale of the Phase 1 project confirmed at the time was a massive undertaking, with a total project cost of 151.3 billion won and an annual input of 11,088 personnel. The plan included introducing 86 main computers, including two large computers for batch processing, and 9,598 workstations (W/S), including those for educational use.

The greatest hurdle was the opposition from the Ministry of Home Affairs, which held a tight grip on resident registration and real estate management. Despite the willingness of the Minister and Vice-Minister of Home Affairs to move forward, requirement generation and fact-finding investigations were completely rejected due to organized resistance from on-site working-level officials (then administrative officers). They insisted on their own pilot project and resisted administrative network integration. Ultimately, following administrative pressure from the Ministry of Government Administration and the Economic Planning Board, alongside efforts by DACOM employees who visited the Ministry of Home Affairs day and night to provide data and conveniences to persuade them, the requirement specification sheets from the Ministry of Home Affairs were finally received in July, immediately after the report of the master plan.

With the enactment of the (Computer Network Act) in May 1986, the project gained rapid momentum. Korea Telecom Promotion, which would take full charge of financial support, was established, and the National Computerization Agency (NCA), responsible for legal auditing and standardization, launched in December 1986 and opened in January of the following year. Seong-jin Kim, former Minister of Science and Technology, assumed office as the inaugural president.

In March 1987, the Ministry of Government Administration converted and expanded the existing 'Administrative Computerization Promotion Regulations' into the Computer Network Act framework, strongly encouraging computerization projects in connection with the 6th Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1987–1991). A powerful directive was handed down stating that development should occur under the responsibility of each ministry, but shared utilization tasks would be progressively absorbed and integrated into the administrative network, standardization would be maintained, and the indiscreet introduction of foreign computers would be restrained. In April 1987, the Computer Network Coordination Committee re-added national pension operations, which had been excluded due to incomplete legislation, confirming the 7 priority tasks. It finalized the master plan, including main computer development plans and fund allocation plans, following presidential approval.

(C) Korea Telecommunication Authority

The Disruption of Financial Sourcing and Leftover Challenges

From the initial report of the National Backbone Computer Network blueprint to the Blue House in July 1983, it took 3 years and 9 months for the Phase 1 Master Plan to be finalized. Behind this grand national project lay a critical spark that would torment project managers for a long time to come. This was the financial sourcing plan based on the 'pre-investment and post-settlement' method determined due to the rejection by the Economic Planning Board.

At the time, the Economic Planning Board enforced a method where Korea Telecom Promotion provided funding and DACOM made pre-investments, with the government settling the costs later. This was done under the rationale that there were no legal or institutional means to allocate a multi-year budget for a large-scale computer network project all at once, and from an interministerial egoistic perspective of minimizing the burden on ministries. This was an irresponsible measure that transferred the risks of a public infrastructure project, which should have been directly guaranteed by the state budget, to private enterprises and dedicated agencies, becoming the root cause of continuous financial pressure and disputes during the subsequent operation of the project.

Nevertheless, on January 17, 1987, DACOM decisively expanded and reorganized the Administrative Network Project Group for full-scale project execution. Executive Director Chi-young Kwak took over as the project group director, Director Dong-wook Lee headed the Development Division, and Director Chul-soo Lee headed the Deployment Division. Dr. Chul-soo Lee recalled the urgent duties of that time as follows:

"I was tasked with the overall technical management responsibility, including the resident management operations—which involved the most severe conflicts and discussions at the time—as well as total system integration (SI), data center construction, the introduction of domestic main computers and W/S, and network configuration. It was a moment standing at the center of a massive turning point."

Behind the success of this monumental task lay the dedication of working-level bureaucrats at the Ministry of Government Administration, the coordinating ministry. In particular, Jin-sik Won, Director-General of the Administrative Management Bureau, and Tae-kyum Kim, Director of the Administrative Computerization Division, demonstrated outstanding administrative capabilities by coordinating severe opposition and disagreements among ministries, and by acquiring and providing necessary technical information from related enterprises and research institutes. However, the phenomenon where core talents who accumulated such expertise were transferred to entirely different fields following the practice of job rotation instead of continuously exerting their specialization after the project ended remained a painful mistake in terms of nurturing professional bureaucrats.

The short-sightedness of political circles attempting to deny the information technology achievements of preceding administrations or reset projects whenever a regime changes is another legacy that must be avoided. This is because information technology projects, which are grand national plans for the future, can only fully blossom upon long-term philosophy and policy consistency. In the spring of 1987, the Korean administrative computer network thus took its historic first step, overcoming the waves of technical uncertainty and financial shortages.

(To be continued in Part 3)